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Post by 4verts on Mar 28, 2014 19:21:17 GMT -6
What did you do there, coach? They did a case study on the program that I worked for last year. I was responsible for the game book in the box. I don't know that they do HS products, but it would be worth asking.
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Post by coachd5085 on Mar 28, 2014 19:44:08 GMT -6
I liken this discussion about analytics to supplements in the fitness profession. People AGONIZE over supplementation, which brand, what quantities, timing, combining, etc. etc, and then they polish off a 20 pack of nuggets and ice cream daily.
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Post by Deleted on Mar 28, 2014 20:45:28 GMT -6
A lot of the discussion here is about raw numbers crunching, but football by itself is more complex than that and more meaningful, useful analytical may be derived from watching film and looking at different variables and how they impact plays in specific situations, rather than just pulling a bunch of reports on stats off HUDL.
For example, lately as I've been researching the Flexbone, I keep seeing references to the way Navy and GT use analytics to make their offense more efficient. One of the things Navy found from film study was that their Zone Dive play really only worked when the PSLB was already flying out to play the option. When they called the play just to keep the ball to the FB's hands and that LB wasn't already taking himself out of the play, it didn't work. That's helped them to figure out when to run the play and fit it into the wider context of what they do.
That, to me, is the kind of analysis that can pay off more than sorting raw stats on a spreadsheet to look for numerical patterns. The proof is in the film.
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Post by silkyice on Mar 28, 2014 21:50:08 GMT -6
We practiced one play probably 5 times a week for 16 weeks. We used it once. It went for 70 yards with 6 minutes to go in the state championship game with game tied 20-20. We won 27-16. It was worth it. A play that scores 6 points AND takes away 4 of your opponents points? Must be the greatest play in all of football LOL. 27-26
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Post by lochness on Mar 29, 2014 6:55:19 GMT -6
I did the same thing last off-season and came to some different conclusions: 1. I want to slow down the offense, huddle up and dedicate to the run. 2. Get back under center and away from the spread, and as a result, i will be a better coach. and that seemed to work. Blasphemy!! How will you get athletes in space, generate excitement in the community, keep 12 guys out of the box, and get more kids out for football if you do this? ?!!!!!
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Post by fantom on Mar 29, 2014 8:51:15 GMT -6
I looked at their site. They have a chart showing the "costliest" 4th down/2 point decisions of 2012 in college football. According to them the worst decision came in the NC State-Miami game. Behind 34-37 with 4th and 5 at the Miami 34 and 2:31 left to play, State kicked the tying FG. To that point, they had been at about 50% on 3rd/4th down conversions. Presumably, this was a poor decision because Miami won the game 44-37. However, they won on a 62 yard TD pass with 19 seconds to play (on 3rd and 11). Under the circumstances, I have a hard time buying the idea that this was really the worst decision of the year.
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Post by coachd5085 on Mar 29, 2014 9:01:35 GMT -6
I think one reason why many of those in the education profession are somewhat less than enthusiastic discussing analytics is that we have seen what they have done in education. Students went from people...to data points--and none of the great data analysis ever addressed the fundamental issues that led to the data those in charge were trying to "cure"
The football analogy is that things the analytics show will usuall boil down to fundamental factors the coaches are already well aware of.
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Post by Deleted on Mar 29, 2014 11:26:59 GMT -6
Exactly.
One if the most common instances of analytics being applied to football is the "eight things that correlate to winning" study. It included things like "having more big plays than the other team increases your odds of winning."
Well, no chit!
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Post by blb on Mar 29, 2014 13:50:12 GMT -6
Exactly. One if the most common instances of analytics being applied to football is the "eight things that correlate to winning" study. It included things like "having more big plays than the other team increases your odds of winning." Well, no chit!
...and those "Analytics" don't tell you anything about HOW to get those "more big plays than the other team."
We once beat a well-coached team 41-0 because they could not move the ball at all against us.
We had trouble moving it consistently against them, too - but we hit several big plays.
He was quoted in the paper the next day as saying, "Well, if you take those five or six big plays out, it was a close game."
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Post by s73 on Mar 29, 2014 15:41:48 GMT -6
I think many HS coaches fall into the quantity v. quality of time spent on FB. "I must be coaching well b/c I spend so much time on it".
I do not mean to offend anyone who breaks down all of those statistics. I think some people are more analytical than others and know how to use some of that stuff, but I also think some guys use it w/ no rhyme or reason b/c they aren't sure what they're looking for.
For me, I have tried to coach by the mantra of "smarter not harder" for more than a decade now & since I began doing that, my program has been significantly more successful. JMO, but I think a lot of that stuff is to make you think you doing more than what you are, but in reality is just a "filler". Again, no offense, JMO.
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Analytics
Mar 29, 2014 16:09:06 GMT -6
via mobile
Post by silkyice on Mar 29, 2014 16:09:06 GMT -6
For example, lately as I've been researching the Flexbone, I keep seeing references to the way Navy and GT use analytics to make their offense more efficient. One of the things Navy found from film study was that their Zone Dive play really only worked when the PSLB was already flying out to play the option. When they called the play just to keep the ball to the FB's hands and that LB wasn't already taking himself out of the play, it didn't work. That's helped them to figure out when to run the play and fit it into the wider context of what they do. That, to me, is the kind of analysis that can pay off more than sorting raw stats on a spreadsheet to look for numerical patterns. The proof is in the film. Coacharnold, I am not going to pick on what you said, because it is the truth. But I am going to pick on Navy. They really needed film or analytics to tell them that? A coach from 60 years ago could have told them the same thing about the belly, belly option, and belly pass. Hey, when the olb stays home, belly option and pass don't work so good. But when the olb starts flying in to stop belly, well dadgum, belly option is great. And when that corner starts running to the pitchman, and the safety starts running to the qb on belly option, well katie bar the door, that there belly pass is wide slap open.
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Post by Chris Clement on Mar 29, 2014 23:28:02 GMT -6
Here's an example: Our defence thought we were god-awful against motion. They'd go into full panic at the thought of it. "The players don't understand the checks," "Players X and Y get lost whenever two receivers get near each other." We thought it was giving up so many big plays that it's what singlehandedly cost us a game.
By identifying every play with motion for every team over the last two seasons we found that not only was our YPA (Mo) vs YPA (No-Mo) one of the best in the league, but also that YPA (Mo) < YPA (No-Mo). We thought we had the best quads D in the league, so I tested that hypothesis the same way, and there our hypothesis was correct, so assumptions like that are unreliable and probably influenced by singular plays in high-leverage situations.
If you think you can go through 70 games and 12000 plays and come away with sound conclusions like that, then have fun.
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Post by spos21ram on Mar 30, 2014 13:07:10 GMT -6
Here's an example: Our defence thought we were god-awful against motion. They'd go into full panic at the thought of it. "The players don't understand the checks," "Players X and Y get lost whenever two receivers get near each other." We thought it was giving up so many big plays that it's what singlehandedly cost us a game. By identifying every play with motion for every team over the last two seasons we found that not only was our YPA (Mo) vs YPA (No-Mo) one of the best in the league, but also that YPA (Mo) < YPA (No-Mo). We thought we had the best quads D in the league, so I tested that hypothesis the same way, and there our hypothesis was correct, so assumptions like that are unreliable and probably influenced by singular plays in high-leverage situations. If you think you can go through 70 games and 12000 plays and come away with sound conclusions like that, then have fun. I may have read this wrong, but does it really matter if you think you aren't good against motion? Most importantly you were good against motion, so isn't that all that matters? What changed in your coaching after you realized your defense was just fine vs. motion. If you defended it well wouldn't nothing change? The bigger question is why did you think you were bad against motion? Sent from my SAMSUNG-SGH-I747 using proboards
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Post by Chris Clement on Mar 30, 2014 13:40:54 GMT -6
What changed is that we stopped trying to fix a non-problem. There was a lot of energy being out into trying to figure out what combination of players and plays would work because we thought that every time they bunched or ran jet we were getting torched. The reason we thought we were so bad at motion is because a couple of times we got torched by missing a bunch check and it cost us big time, but we weren't "bad at motion," we just screwed up those couple times and because they "cost us the game" it stuck in our minds as being "bad at motion."
So we see how random probability (you're going to screw up at check every once in a while, happened to occur at this particular moment) combined with one psychological effect (that play didn't really cost us the game, it took a full game to lose that one) and another (the big play sticks out and is given undue importance over all the dull 2nd and 7 plays that we stopped) lead to an erroneous belief (we're bad at defending motion) that nearly turned into schematic/personnel changes that weren't needed and probably would have proven deleterious.
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Post by CoachCP on Mar 31, 2014 6:44:30 GMT -6
I would say there most definitely is a place for Analytics in football. It's silly to say otherwise. The question is the extent of it and the efficiency of it itself.
I'm one of the people who believe that players should know little about stats and stay true to their reads on the field because those are always right where tendencies are just ... tendencies. Coaches should know that stuff, not players.
But This discussion is about us coaches. You need to ask yourself, is doing this research going to help us win? And don't just think about it from an opponent perspective or play perspective. Look at the big picture.
There is a lot of historical data you can dig into from the ] pro level (http://www.advancednflstats.com/2010/04/play-by-play-data.html). It's not perfect, but it's a starting point and the insights are great and you can compare them to your own stats to see if the numbers are close (even if they aren't significant - yet - which is hard to do in football).
We're going to look for a "big metric". Something that helps us be more productive on our side of the ball that we can help control. Time of possession is always one. No turnovers is also a big one (but that's hard to control). But let's think outside the box.
For example, we might find out know that "explosive" plays increases a teams chance of scoring on that drive. Explosive plays are run plays of over 12 yards and passes over 15. The more we get per drive, the better our chance of scoring. This is valuable for the defense when they do risk/reward analysis as well when they decide are they going to be "aggressive" or "simple" in their schemes and calls.
Once I believe in a concept (like the one above), I need to find ways to increase explosive plays. That's the hard part. Then I dig in my data for that, or I build a theory and stick to it when calling plays.
I should look to see which running plays and passing plays created the most explosive plays (look at your data for this). You need to be careful and control for the opponent a bit (maybe take the ones that had the most average explosive plays per game).
For instance, I might believe that a strong running game with a complete play action game will lead to more explosive plays. Or maybe it's intermediate passing plays. Or the screen game.
I should then see if my data supports it. Again, look at the big data and your own.
If that assumption is true (about running plays and play action) I need to dedicate the appropriate time to supporting this in the off-season with my coaches, and then the practice time (as you all discussed above) to making these plays work.
If it's not true, think about other ways to improve that metric. Maybe it's something more specific. Maybe it's a specific running play. Or maybe it's just all "outside" running plays and their play actions.
Once you find it, and you have data that supports running it, try it. Make it your goal to see if those things ultimately improve your chances of winning. Now, obviously if you are playing a team that's giving you 9 in the box and you can throw all day without play action - do that, but that's an extreme. Remember that data isn't smart. Information is because YOU use it when it's appropriate. Its a tool, not an answer to all your problems. It won't always be perfect, and it doesn't have to be. It just has to help you win.
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Post by 4verts on Mar 31, 2014 10:24:24 GMT -6
I looked at their site. They have a chart showing the "costliest" 4th down/2 point decisions of 2012 in college football. According to them the worst decision came in the NC State-Miami game. Behind 34-37 with 4th and 5 at the Miami 34 and 2:31 left to play, State kicked the tying FG. To that point, they had been at about 50% on 3rd/4th down conversions. Presumably, this was a poor decision because Miami won the game 44-37. However, they won on a 62 yard TD pass with 19 seconds to play (on 3rd and 11). Under the circumstances, I have a hard time buying the idea that this was really the worst decision of the year. Worked well for us is all I'm saying. We were top 10 in the country in 4th down percentage and scored a TD on 13 of 14 drives where we converted a 4th down. Following their chart it takes into account field position versus the clock and win percentage by decision based on every college game for the last 5-10 years. We thought of it as a supplement to the "gut feeling".
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Post by larrymoe on Mar 31, 2014 10:49:24 GMT -6
We were top 10 in the country in 4th down percentage How in the hell do you know that? Unless you are a college coach and if you are I apologize for not knowing who you are.
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Post by Chris Clement on Mar 31, 2014 11:44:15 GMT -6
I looked at their site. They have a chart showing the "costliest" 4th down/2 point decisions of 2012 in college football. According to them the worst decision came in the NC State-Miami game. Behind 34-37 with 4th and 5 at the Miami 34 and 2:31 left to play, State kicked the tying FG. To that point, they had been at about 50% on 3rd/4th down conversions. Presumably, this was a poor decision because Miami won the game 44-37. However, they won on a 62 yard TD pass with 19 seconds to play (on 3rd and 11). Under the circumstances, I have a hard time buying the idea that this was really the worst decision of the year. That's post hoc thinking. It's a dumb decision because they're pretty good at converting and 2:30 is way too much time to leave for a Miami team that only needs a FG to win. NC State was very lucky just to force 3-11.
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Post by larrymoe on Mar 31, 2014 11:51:46 GMT -6
Looking back at any single play in a football game is usually pointless. Change one play here or there in a game and it's an entirely different game. Our costliest play of the year happened on the fifth play of the game in our third playoff game. Not really because of the call or even the result of the play, but what it did for our team psyche and morale.
Oh well, I don't get the whole analytic thing, but then again, I don't even watch film from our past seasons.
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Post by fantom on Mar 31, 2014 13:17:06 GMT -6
I looked at their site. They have a chart showing the "costliest" 4th down/2 point decisions of 2012 in college football. According to them the worst decision came in the NC State-Miami game. Behind 34-37 with 4th and 5 at the Miami 34 and 2:31 left to play, State kicked the tying FG. To that point, they had been at about 50% on 3rd/4th down conversions. Presumably, this was a poor decision because Miami won the game 44-37. However, they won on a 62 yard TD pass with 19 seconds to play (on 3rd and 11). Under the circumstances, I have a hard time buying the idea that this was really the worst decision of the year. That's post hoc thinking. It's a dumb decision because they're pretty good at converting and 2:30 is way too much time to leave for a Miami team that only needs a FG to win. NC State was very lucky just to force 3-11. I think that calling this a mistake is second-guessing. With a 4th and 5, if you have a good kicker it's hard for me to argue against tying the game on a 4th and 5.
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Post by spreadattack on Mar 31, 2014 13:36:04 GMT -6
You can get all that 4th down info for free online with the NY Times 4th down calculator, the Advanced NFL Stats site, and fotballstudyhall.com
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Post by Chris Clement on Mar 31, 2014 14:04:10 GMT -6
That's asking a college kid to make a 51yd FG.
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Post by coachb0 on Mar 31, 2014 14:16:51 GMT -6
it comes down to the same thing as it was in the thread about "stats" the other day: If you need numbers to reaffirm what you already know, knock yourself out. coaches who look at analytics believe they don't know it all. (i think thats a good thing. never stop improving - not only your team, but yourself)
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Post by fantom on Mar 31, 2014 17:11:52 GMT -6
That's asking a college kid to make a 51yd FG. A college kid who's on scholarship. He made it, too.
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Post by blb on Mar 31, 2014 17:29:57 GMT -6
That's asking a college kid to make a 51yd FG.
College kids have been making FGs over 50 yards for 40+ years, and they're better now than ever.
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Post by spos21ram on Mar 31, 2014 17:38:41 GMT -6
it comes down to the same thing as it was in the thread about "stats" the other day: If you need numbers to reaffirm what you already know, knock yourself out. coaches who look at analytics believe they don't know it all. (i think thats a good thing. never stop improving - not only your team, but yourself) Unless you're spending so much time on stats that you neglect time for other important things. I love playing with numbers, don't get me wrong, but the longer I've done this the more I question how helpful it is/was. As others have stated some numbers will help you get better, some mean nothing. For example...After a game you're talking to another staff member and say "man we couldn't run buck sweep for the life of us tonight." After film break down a couple days later you get the exact numbers. You ran Buck Sweep 9 times for 15 yards. Then you can break it down even more vs what front, field/boundary, whatever. Guess what, after reading all the stats, you say "man we couldn't run buck sweep for the life us us friday night. You knew just as much info as you did before you ran the numbers. It's like playing poker. Anyone that plays/played poker regularly knows that if you have AK vs AA that you're royally screwd. Do you really need to know that you odds of winning the hand are about 7%? No because you already know your odds are terrible. Knowing it's 7% doesn't change anything and help you at all. It doesn't give you any new information.
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Post by coachd5085 on Mar 31, 2014 17:48:04 GMT -6
I would say there most definitely is a place for Analytics in football. It's silly to say otherwise. The question is the extent of it and the efficiency of it itself. I'm one of the people who believe that players should know little about stats and stay true to their reads on the field because those are always right where tendencies are just ... tendencies. Coaches should know that stuff, not players. But This discussion is about us coaches. You need to ask yourself, is doing this research going to help us win? And don't just think about it from an opponent perspective or play perspective. Look at the big picture. There is a lot of historical data you can dig into from the ] pro level (http://www.advancednflstats.com/2010/04/play-by-play-data.html). It's not perfect, but it's a starting point and the insights are great and you can compare them to your own stats to see if the numbers are close (even if they aren't significant - yet - which is hard to do in football). We're going to look for a "big metric". Something that helps us be more productive on our side of the ball that we can help control. Time of possession is always one. No turnovers is also a big one (but that's hard to control). But let's think outside the box. For example, we might find out know that "explosive" plays increases a teams chance of scoring on that drive. Explosive plays are run plays of over 12 yards and passes over 15. The more we get per drive, the better our chance of scoring. This is valuable for the defense when they do risk/reward analysis as well when they decide are they going to be "aggressive" or "simple" in their schemes and calls. Once I believe in a concept (like the one above), I need to find ways to increase explosive plays. That's the hard part. Then I dig in my data for that, or I build a theory and stick to it when calling plays. I should look to see which running plays and passing plays created the most explosive plays (look at your data for this). You need to be careful and control for the opponent a bit (maybe take the ones that had the most average explosive plays per game). For instance, I might believe that a strong running game with a complete play action game will lead to more explosive plays. Or maybe it's intermediate passing plays. Or the screen game. I should then see if my data supports it. Again, look at the big data and your own. If that assumption is true (about running plays and play action) I need to dedicate the appropriate time to supporting this in the off-season with my coaches, and then the practice time (as you all discussed above) to making these plays work. If it's not true, think about other ways to improve that metric. Maybe it's something more specific. Maybe it's a specific running play. Or maybe it's just all "outside" running plays and their play actions. Once you find it, and you have data that supports running it, try it. Make it your goal to see if those things ultimately improve your chances of winning. Now, obviously if you are playing a team that's giving you 9 in the box and you can throw all day without play action - do that, but that's an extreme. Remember that data isn't smart. Information is because YOU use it when it's appropriate. Its a tool, not an answer to all your problems. It won't always be perfect, and it doesn't have to be. It just has to help you win. OOOOOORRRRRRRRRR..... I can just make sure my players are as strong as I can get them, fast as I can get them, line up in the right place, react to their keys or make their calls the best they can, get off the snap as fast as they can, keep their pad level as low as they can, strike as aggressively as they can... run their routes the best you can, etc. etc. I think your post shows exactly why analytics can be "dangerous", particular for young coaches. Talking about "creating" explosive plays, testing against data etc... when what really matters are the things I typed above. silkyice gave an excellent example in a thread similar to this--showing how "belly" was a good play one year, and an EXPLOSIVE play the second year. The change-- Went from a H.S running back to a kid who signed at Nebraska.
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Post by 4verts on Mar 31, 2014 17:56:00 GMT -6
Following these guys charts and recommendations won us a ball game this year that allowed us to be bowl eligible and not lose our jobs. The actual book that they provide is way beyond anything on advanced stats.com. Call me crazy all you like, but that one win alone will keep me a client wherever I go.
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Post by spos21ram on Mar 31, 2014 18:01:42 GMT -6
Going back to the "whether to kick a 51 yard field goal or not" in that situation...My decision may be to go for it one year and to kick the FG another....It depends on my personnel and what our capabilities are. If I have a kicker who can make a 51 yard field goal somewhat regularly and our offense has been struggling I'm definitely going to kick it.
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Post by blb on Mar 31, 2014 18:07:43 GMT -6
Going back to the "whether to kick a 51 yard field goal or not" in that situation...My decision may be to go for it one year and to kick the FG another....It depends on my personnel and what our capabilities are. If I have a kicker who can make a 51 yard field goal somewhat regularly and our offense has been struggling I'm definitely going to kick it.
...not to mention field conditions and weather.
Or the other team's propensity for blocking kicks.
Pure Analytics or data don't account for those considerations when making in-game decisions.
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